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FROM SURVIVAL TO LIVELIHOOD IN MOZAMBIQUE
Reginald Herbold Green and Maria Mavie
Time past and time future
Are both - perhaps - contained in time present.
all time is irredeemable.
T. S. Eliot
We must look our mistakes squarely in the face
Lest we fall into repeating them.
- Rui Baltasar Santos
Sometime Finance Minister, Mozambique
1 INTRODUCTION
Disasters can be usefully divided into two categories:
natural, in Southern Africa droughts, floods and
severe storms; and man-made, characterized by vio-
lent civil disorder and war. It is perhaps convenient
to use Mozambican terminology of 'calamities' for
the first and 'catastrophes' for the second. For both
calamities and catastrophes, the objectives of disaster
relief are survival of afflicted populations and reha-
bilitation of their livelihoods. The first is a prior
condition - the livelihoods of the over 1,500,000
Mozambicans dead because of the 1980-1992 war can
no longerbe rehabilitated. But survival is notenough.
Lost assets (whether blown up bridges or drought-
dead cattle) do not restore themselves; the speed of
dislocated households' ability to rehabilitate their
livelihoods is significantly dependent on appropri-
ate supporting measures and resource allocations;
restoring human capacity and building service and
market access is a complex, tedious and expensive
process (cf. UNICEF 1989 and 1993 and Green 1994).
Calamities on their own require substantial rehabili-
tation, as a phase conceptually between survival-
support and medium-term development strategy
implementation, albeit practically overlapping both
(see papers by Seaman, Davies and Buchanan-Smith!
Maxwell in this Bulletin). However, the need to make
reconstruction and rehabilitation central to medium
term macro-economic food security and poverty re-
duction strategies arises more particularly in the case
of catastrophes or complex calamity/catastrophe
mbes. In such cases, peace and rain create the
necessary preconditions for recovery, but are not
sufficient conditions for achieving it.
Unfortunately, there is both next to no historic expe-
rience with post war reconstruction and livelihood
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rehabilitation as a strategic priority in SSA, and
very little conceptual attention to it by donors,
most NGOs, SSA governments (with the notable
exception of Mozambique) or, until quite recently,
academic and practitioner researchers and ana-
lytical writers: it has remained an 'unserviced limbo'
in development.
This article sketches the nature of rehabilitation re-
construction requirements after catastrophes in SSA
and illustrates the approach by looking at the
country which has placed the highest priority ort the
process - Mozambique.
Mozambique has suffered under war since 1964
when the liberation war against Portugal began.
However, following independence and until 1981,
the areas of combat were limited, as were its levels,
and a reconstruction and recovery dynamic, plus
substantial ground-breaking in human/human in-
vestment services, had been established. This dy-
namic was reversed by South African-activated and
(until 1991) dominated destabilization, carried out
by Renamo over 1982-1992 (see UNICEF 1989).
The cumulative loss of output by 1992 exceeded
$20,000 million or ten times actual 1992 output
(projected from UNICEF 1989 as are most other
numerical estimates in this section). The loss of life -
primarily from the interaction of collapsed rural
health services, disrupted food production and
blocked transport routes - was of the order of 1,500,000,
albeit Under-5 mortality had fallen from a 1986
estimate of over 325 per 1,000 live births to under 300.
Over half the population (probably 12,500,000 in
Mozambique and 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 refugees
versus a counterfactual 16,500,000 in Mozambique
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without war) had been forced out of production.
1,500,000 to 2,000,000 were international refugees;
2,000,000 internal refugees in camps or resettlement
schemes; 2,000,000-plus dislocated, but not in formal
camps (and, as a result, often worse off than those
who were) and over 1,000,000 nominally in home
areas but in fact lurking around ruined villages,
scrabbling out a little food by day and hiding
by night, for a total of the order of 7,000,000. (cf.
Mozambique 1991, 1992.)
Absolute poverty in 1992 afflicted over 60 per cent
of all Mozambicans - over 50 per cent urban and
70 per cent of rural households (Mozambique 1991
1992 with the urban figure confirmed by 1992-1994
Household Urban Budget Studies by National
Directorate of Statistics). The government - as a
result of the disastrously eroded revenue base
and high war expenditure - was also absolutely
poor, with perhaps 70 per cent of combined recur-
rent, capital and emergency (survival support)
spending externally financed, programmed and -
especially in the last category - operated (internal
NDP estimates, broadly consistent with those of
the World Bank).
The weakness of state financial, physical and per-
sonnel capacity had frustrated donors, who in re-
sponse had created a host of expatriate-run enclaves
within the state system, plus a host of overlapping
parallel donor government and external NGO
delivery systems, which, in practice, fragmented and
decapacitated the state further (cf. Hanlon 1991).
From 1988, substantial elements in Mozambique's
leadership and state institutions - including the
President, Prime Minister, Planning, Finance and
Health - began to focus on and articulate poverty
reduction as a strategic economic and production as
well as socio-political and welfare (or ill-fare
alleviation) goal (Mozambique 1991). The produc-
tion enabling aspects by 1990 had come to focus
on post-war reconstruction and livelihood rehabili-
tation for and by war dislocated households
(Mozambique 1992a, 1992b).
Reconstruction relates to physical and social (e.g. health, edu-
cation) infrastructure and is particularly relevant in post-war
situations but also after floods. Rehabilitation relates to household
livelihoods and is equally relevant to calamities and catastrophes.
2 For example, since 1974/75 Eastern and Southern Africa has
apparently had five year cycles: five good, five bad. Both are relative
- an average or moderately good year is possible in abad cycle and
a moderately poor or average in a good. Except in very extreme
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2 REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION1
What is needed varies with context. One set of
diversities relates to crisis in terms of responses
needed and for how long:
a Projectibility of Recurrence - e.g. droughts do
recur and are cyclical (albeit their periodicity may
vary)2 but wars (and their duration) much less so;
b Length of Crisis Period - e.g. floods (in South-
ern Africa) rarely recur in successive years except in
a few river deltas, droughts rarely run to more than
three disaster years in a row (but two is quite com-
mon); wars are not predictable;
c Breadth/Depth of Decapitalization - war is clearly
worst, flood usually second (albeit over small areas
in the case of Southern Africa), drought in pastoral
economies variable (largely depending on duration
and severity) and drought for field or tree crops;
d Whether Afflicted Persons Have to Move -
which greatly exacerbates (and may prevent) re-
habilitation - worst for war, preventable with
adequate, early response in the case of drought.3
e Cumulative Impact (of repetitive crises) - prob-
ably most severe in the case of pastoralists (or agro-
pastoralists) in both drought and war conditions.
Another set of diversities relates to household pat-
terns: tree crop dominant; field crop dominant;
pastoral dominant; wage income (agro or other)
significant. In general, the first few normally show
a rising order of impact and of barriers to reha-
bilitation in the case of calamities, while the last
is very contextual (e.g. seasonal agricultural wages
are likely to be devastated; public works wage
incomes may actually rise, e.g. Botswana).
In practice, calamity afflicted households, who had
to leave home areas, may need transport and are
likely to need tools and basic household goods, as
well as seeds and food, up to the first harvest. If they
have been 'away' for over a year they may need
cases some countries and some districts in countries do not conform
to the pattern. For example, even in 1991/92 Tanzania was - overall
- not severely affected nor were the two Northernmost Provinces
of Mozambique nor some districts in three others even though
nationally over half of normal grain output was lost.
'Vide 1950-l994Tanzania, 1975-1980 Mozambique versus 1982-1992
Mozambique and Angola.
clearing tools and - depending on return timing -
food support for up to 15 months. A rapid succession
of calamities has a cumulative impact and may re-
quire additional replacement working capital injec-
tion. This is true especially, but not only, for
pastoralists.4
Catastrophe afflicted households, on the other hand,
need a broader and longer term 'enabling' pro-
gramme. It includes physical infrastructure, social
infrastructure/basic services and market-access re-
habilitation. Ideally, it would include works em-
ployment programmes on an enhanced basis for up
to five years.5
Mozambique has both kinds of household. How-
ever, given the numbers involved, a central problem
concerns the process of 'going home'.
Baseline data - necessarily vague before return - are
needed to programme on an intelligent, articulated
basis.
How many people have fled? From where? (Not
all empty areas were ever populated, e.g. half of
Mozambique was, for good reasons, very sparsely
peopled in 1980 before the war, as shown on 1980
Census population distribution maps.)
To where? (Usually home district and often same
land, cf. UNOHAC 1994 Mozambique mapping of
actual and planned return levels.)
How do nominally resettled view themselves?
(Often as dislocated and wishing to return - internal
memoranda of National Planning Directorate based
on fragmentary observations.)
What present resources? (Some refugees have
tools and food stocks from farming in exile.)
With what perceived needs? (Transit camps and
central land allocation rarely came high on their
lists.)
Most pastoral communities have coping mechanisms involving
loans in kind, repaid in kind, to hard-hit households. These erode
when crises are long lasting or quickly repeated and especially if a
very high per cent of families are seriously afflicted and total herd
loss percentages very high, e.g. much of Central and Southern,
though not North-Western or North-Eastern Somalia, in 1993 (cf.
Green 1993c).
The purpose is not simply - or even necessarily primarily - to buy
food. Households have cash needs - toots, seed, salt-sugar-teal
coffee, cooking oil, cloth, school and health service costs. If no other
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How fast and how do they plan to return? (All at
once as complete households is an unlikely answer.)
How much farm and home reconstruction and
repair is needed? (This affects tools needed, duration
of food requirement - as working capital - and how
much time will be available to take up public works
wage-earning opportunities.)
Mozambique has made efforts to estimate these
parameters from both the district of origin and
present location ends, an exercise beginning in 1990
and now somewhat overtaken by events (probably
over 5,000,000 of 7,000,000 catastrophe-impacted
are back at work on home farms).
Return processes are usually phased. A common
model includes: community scouts to report on
situation (including security); pioneers (usually adult
males) to start clearing and rebuilding; additional
family members returning - some for part of the year;
full return. This works well with minimum assist-
ance when it can be built up over several years, is to
a nearby area and is by people with some exile
livelihood (as illustrated in Angoche District of Tete
Province since 1988/89). For further away districts,
with no initial 'welcoming' group and low or nil
food reserves in asylum areas, it is much harder.
This pattern implies that camp-based refugees/dis-
located persons will need to remain on the camp food
roster until the fourth and final phase. Pioneers will
return to collect food - witness the otherwise
bemusingly high levels of two way traffic among
Malawi and Sofala and Zambesia in 1993 reported
by several observers. The refugee camp model is
supposed to be whole family return with limited
food support for six months or less. In rehabilita-
tion/ reconstruction cases, this is quite simply not
realistic. Out-in-out patterns unfortunately often
lead to perceptions of fraud.6
The strategy set out is designed to enable disaster
afflicted households to return home and to restore
source of cash is available, they wilt use food as their cash crop even
if the result is inadequate nutrition. The five year period assumes
gradual return home over three years.
Many refugee agency staff often appear to view those they are
supposed to serve as inherently criminal in nature, with "cheating
UNHCR" their main aim. This is, perhaps, not a very productive
approach and certainly not one conducive to working out support
for phased return with either home district support or regular
returns to camp for food.
their livelihoods within parameters informed by
their own goals/needs. The intent is to coordinate
and to manage services (whether 'transport'7 home
or operational support to mediating disputes within
land allocation by 'elders' or 'chiefs') not to manage
returnees.
The approach of enabling as opposed to managing!
directing has been stressed by Mozambique's Plan-
ning Directorate. Somewhat to the Directorate's
surprise, most donors and many refugee related
NGOs have criticized it for not specifying what
returnees 'should do'. Provincial and district offi-
cials have been more attuned to such an approach -
perhaps because it reduces the work load on them,
especially as to issuing and trying to effectuate in-
structions unlikely to be welcomed or followed.
Orders to returnees would be likely to be objectively
wrong as well as unwelcome and there are rather
better things for a weak post catastrophe govern-
ment to do than to issue orders which are perceived
as foolish and objectionable and clearly cannot be
enforced.
3 A PROGRAMME CHECK LIST
The key elements in household return and livelihood
rehabilitation programmes appear to include:
a transport home: Though, unless the distance is
over 200 km, this may be less important than usually
supposed, especially for early pathfinder/pioneer
phases. In practice most dislocated persons return on
their own (90 per cent in Mozambique to date, judg-
ing by UNOHAC and UNHCR internal estimates);
b food until harvest: Clearing, building, preparing
land, planting, tilling, harvesting are hard work and
there are no instant crops and often few surviving
feral food sources. Transit or holding camps are nt
a large part of the answer because they delay getting
back to work on the land;
c seeds/tools/draught animals/small-stock and
poultry/core livestock herds (for pastoralists);
d other inputs: Building materials, fertiliser,
pesticides, while sometimes cited, appear to be low
'Transport' may well be self-provided although long distance
(over 50 kilometre) returns at the whole family stage are likely to
benefit from access to a lorry especially if some goods and/or small
stock were saved or acquired tu the place of refuge. This is iOu-
strative of the enabling, not social engineering, approach. Dislocated
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priority in context of very scarce resources. Tools
to clear and to build, of course, are in category 'c'
and are a priority;
e secure access to and use rights over land: State
allocation is likely to be impracticable.8 Use of pre-
crisis, neo-traditional system plus dispute resolution
mechanism is probably usually workable. Aban-
doned large farms will be taken over, unless the
owner gets back in time to have a physical presence.
Attempts to prevent this are likely to be very
conflictual, politically imprudent in contexts of demo-
cratic election and minimally effective. This point is
put very forcibly by many Mozambican District!
Provincial officials and some Provincial Governors.
'You will start a ti civil war' commented one
(internal NDP resumé of land issues workshop);
f restoration of Health-Water-Education: (Basic
human investment) both to 'enable', through time
saving and health improving, and because - together
with physical security - these are at the top of
the displaced households' priority lists of what the
state should provide;
g restoration of Physical Infrastructure: Buildings
for basic human services as well as transport,
necessary government and community buildings -
including housing for teachers, health personnel,
agricultural extension agents, and administrators;
h labour intensive works employment: timed to
peak at low agricultural labour requirement months,
with mechanisms to ensure female access (both to get
the physical infrastructure rebuilding done and to
enhance household cash incomes in initial years);
i restoration of market access: is crucial to family
small farming households. Without it they cannot
produce for sale or work their way out of absolute
poverty. Rural traders! transporters are central, to
buy produce, to sell consumer goods, tools, con-
struction materials, and to provide transport from
Provincial Capitals/large district towns to where
family farming households live. They need access
to lorries, working capital, basic goods for rural
commercial network as a livelihood rehabilitation
priority, not so much in respect to trader livelihoods
households usually know better than governments or NGOs
what pattern of return will best fit their needs and capacities
The concept of delaying return for land demarcation and certifi-
cate issuing - while sometimes proposed - is surreal.
as in respect to those of returnees. If, as in Mozam-
bique, traders are decapitalized and lack access to
term credit, ensuring enterprise (not government)
provision of commercial hire-purchase facilities is a
priority for state action.
4 SOME OBSTACLES
Once the barrier is overcome of acceptance of reha-
bilitation as a basic strategy, a series of specific
weaknesses emerge. In Mozambique, these have
included:
a strategic capacity - weak field level knowledge
from which to aggregate and to analyse; detailed
conceptualization; ability to articulate to link con-
cepts and field data via programmes and interaction
vertically and horizontally within and beyond gov-
ernment.
b provincial and district capacity - limited habit of
asking people and listening to answers; low numbers
of technical/professional personnel even at Provin-
cial (near absence at District) level; lack of any recent
prior articulated planning - implementation experi-
ence at these levels; absence of any bureaucratic
system to routinize the 90 per cent of operations
which are (should be) routine; absence of formal
means to secure user feedback or to receive and
respond to local social sector initiatives;
c understanding of family farming household situa-
fions, e.g. typical hands to mouths ratios; intra house-
hold (gender and age) divisions of labour-income-
expenditure; present and short term potential sources
of income including household self provisioning and
off farm labour as well as cash crop (i.e. crops pro-
duced to sell whatever their use by the buyer); actual
access to and own priority for enhanced access to
basic services and to markets.
d donor past and ongoing decapacitation of gov-
ernment and domestic social sector, i.e. parallel,
The issue is not one of intent. The point is that fragmentation, non-
coordination and multiple authoritarian/clientalist systems from
external bodies to weak, dc facto captive Mozambican units prevent
state accountability (including the accounting as well as the broader
sense) and enabling capacity growth even more than they limit its
ability to coerce or to intervene operationally and cripple social
sector-state relations as well as distorting their external relations.
They are - as their builders fail to realise - not a contribution to
building an accountable-selective-limited role on any blueprint let
alone one responsive to Mozambicans or appropriate to the
Mozambican context.
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non-coordinated, non-accountable systems which
may raise instant capacity in crisis situations but
are contradictory with either national or local
domestic capacity rehabilitation - or domestic
programme 'ownership';9
e donor response lags including desire for a normal
project appraisal format and for quantitative micro-
macro linkage modelling when the former is inap-
propriate as well as impossible and the latter neces-
sarily approximate ex ante.1°
The result of these weaknesses is a set of lags over
1988-1994 - extreme, even by Mozambican standards:
a 1988-90 design of a priority district rehabilitation
programme, 'remodelled' by donors into a narrow
front, long term strategic approach logically follow-
ing iftsi rehabilitation;
b July 1992 first official draft National Recon-
struction Programme (PRN), presented to donors
December 1992;
c 1992-93 - Provincial Planning exercise built around
PRN;
d December 1993 - Proposal of some elements (out of
conceptual context) of PRN to donors by World Bank.
To date, in Mozambique, the results in the budget
and in the field are distressingly modest: initial mine
lifting programmes; somewhat more rehabilitation
focus in health, perhaps education, water, agricul-
ture programming; a clear government reaching out
to the domestic social sector as a co-operating partner
(e.g. President Chissano's 1993 speech on occasion of
Centennial Celebrations of Diocese of Limbos and
Mozambique 1994); partial rehabilitation of provin-
cial planning capacity; studies toward a hire pur-
chase enterprise; continued CENE/DPCCN food
provision to returnees and some parallel UNHCR
input; a change in the climate of discussion in some
10 Oddly the National Reconstruction Programme (Mozambique,
1992b) is the only one in Mozambique which does do this even
approximately. It has order of magnitude projections for GDP,
linkages to other sectors, fiscal sources/uses, external balance as -
e.g. - the rolling, large scale Public Priority Investment Project list
does not. Why it - and not PTII' - should be challenged on this
ground is, therefore, an interesting question.
ministries and the Planning Commission toward
perceiving sector familial livelihood rehabilitation
as socially and economically central; avoidance of
massive interference with returnee self allocation of
home area land for resettlement and of refugee/
dislocated person camp food cut-offs which would
be consistent with their rules but not with returnee
patterns of phased moves home; and at least putting
'the land question' on the agenda in a way limiting
Land Commission/Agriculture allocation of occu-
pied sector familial land to outsiders (external or
domestic).
5 ISSUES OF APPROACH: ITERATIVE
FLEXIBILITY
One way to tackle these problems is by iterative
flexibility. Flexibility based on built-in monitoring
and review as a management tool is likely to be
important to livelihood rehabilitation. Initial data -
especially on returnee numbers, intentions, capaci-
ties and needs - will be, at best, roughly correct
overall and in direction, with numerous gaps and
errors of detail, identifiable only when/if the pro-
gramme is operational. The type of precise data
formulation and analysis suitable for a large hydro-
electric project is neither possible nor suitable.
Rolling programme adjustment (e.g. re prioritizing
which bits of infrastructure to repair/add or what
extension service crop and technique specific content
is appropriate), if built in advance can be practicable
and low cost (as it assuredly is not for a large
dam). Decentralization (to a level allowing
asking programme users and listening to their
answers) is a necessary component of iterative
flexibility.
Loans, grants, privatization and all that are, or
should be, pragmatic not ideological questions. That
is a key matter of approach. Ideological debates lead
to impasses, while dialogue on operational, least
inefficient ways and means often lead to working
agreement on what is to be done.
Initial provision of seeds, tools, food until harvest
etc., should be free. There is a normative case, but
the bottom line is that scores of thousands of small
(say $100), three to five year, low interest loans are
Nominally this is the Mozambique pattem and one many retailers
(local trader/ transporters) welcome. In fact, the very weak banking
system and limits on private or public enterprise to access credit by
frequently make it virtually non-functional. Controlling credit risk
and acting in relation to arrears is necessary but if - as in Tete
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not administrable. Within one to three years credit
purchases of seed/tools, etc. should be via local
commercial enterprises. That is a function they often
can perform if they themselves have access to
commercial credit.
User fees, as a source of revenue, fall in the same
pragmatic means box. Total proposed charges need
to be related to total probable household cash in-
comes and the practicality/cost thought out in
advance with effective exemption procedures to
guarantee access to absolutely poor people. If 90
per cent will need to be exempted and the rest
charged $0.20, then rural primary health care
fees will be remarkably personnel-intensive and net
revenue inefficient (probably negative). User partici-
pation is a different and broader issue. It is harder
to develop, especially because administrators and
professionals are not used to taking service users'
views seriously or delegating operational roles to
them, but potentially more useful (cf. Green 1993d).
Vehicle and working capital loans to the rural com-
mercial network (on commercial terms) are a priority
because that network is vital to household livelihood
restoration and in some cases (notably Mozambique)
to urban food supply, the manufactured goods mar-
ket, exports and the restoration of the indirect tax
base. Rural commerce is best handled by private
(including coop) enterprise. Wholesalers may need
to be mixed if private capacity is low (e.g. even by
1989, Ghana had no wholesalers able to make year
contracts or monthly grain, sugar or vegetable oil
deliveries) and a floor price buyer of last resort
(with actual capacity to buy) mechanism is often
necessary to ensure competition/fair trading.'1
The state should concentrate on doing what no one
else can or will do, including enabling enterprises to
do more (e.g. provide term credit for vehicles). It
should not go in for Stalin Planning, e.g. providing
donor-set, standard, stock-in-kind loans to rural
retailers, instead of bank credit for them to buy
what they believe to be appropriate stock - a route a
bilateral aid agency, as well as foreign NGOs
and, almost incredibly, the World Bank have
advocated in Mozambique. 'Incentive goods' -
usually 30 to 50 lines in rural areas (e.g. Tanzanian
Province in 1993/94 - it brings virtually all private, co-op, public
enterprise crop purchasing to a near halt for most of the main
harvest/immediate post harvest season, that is an unacceptable
result.
unpublished early 1980s surveys) - are crucial, but
rural merchants in daily contact with customers can
determine products and quantities better than any-
one else.
Rehabilitation programming, to be efficient, needs
to be user coordinated (including not only benefi-
ciaries but the field level staff who need to be
able to implement it) and rapidly flexible. At
the same time, it is unlikely to be effective at macro-
level unless there is a national conceptual and
coordinating (including timely data consolidation
and framework exchange) under afflicted-country
leadership.
Local and intermediate level implementation is de-
sirable - especially by user groups, domestic social
sector bodies and local government units, as well as
by foreign NGOs working with and, so far as possi-
ble, accountable to them. In the absence of such a
context, parallel, anarchically autonomous interven-
tions fragment and decapacitate, waste resources
and create a crazy quilt of small, weak domestic user
versus large, powerful external (including NGO)
provider/decider relationships.
How to articulate is a contextual issue - e.g. how to
build village and local roads. So too are the issues
of relating to parallel programmes outside the reha-
bilitation core - e.g. ongoing vaccination, mother
and child care basic health services in rural Mozam-
bique as well as responses (presumably primarily via
Provincial Calamities Commissions) to calamities
such as drought. Conceptually these are 'part of
rehabilitation' but - except for labour intensive infra-
structure reconstruction - operationally they should
be integral parts of health service structures
(from National through District levels) from the
start.'2
Assuming planning is decentralized, relationships
are also needed with other special enabling pro-
grammes which may or may not be a formal part
of rehabilitation13: the 'Iringa Model', community
(usually women's group)-based; district health/ agri-
culture-assisted; locally-chosen, complementary
12 This is crucial because rehabilitation is a finite strategic initiative
which rebuilds certain activities for permanent operation. The
sooner these arelocatedin and seenasoursbypermanentinstitutions
the better. One problem of links to external NGOs is that they,
unlike domestic social sector bodies, seek to come in, set up, hand
over with a depressing lack of strategic planning on how and when
the last will be practicable, consistent with survival of the project or
programme content.
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activities for nutrition or child-care; a National
Nutrition Council and UNICEF backed and coordi-
nated approach (UNICEF 1994) would be an
example if a variant were adopted in Mozambique.
It could hardly be an across the board part of
formal rehabilitation, however, as Tanzanian expe-
rience suggests most initial local programmes
would be in less affected Districts or those in
which rehabilitation was well advanced.
6 CONCLUSION
Given Mozambique's limited personnel, institu-
tional capacity and finance its achievements can
be asserted to be non-trivial. But over 1992-1994
probably 5,000,000 to 5,500,000 out of 7,000,000
refugees, dislocated persons and pauperized in
place household have returned home: the attempt
to have a programme in being to meet and to
support them has failed. The same holds true in
Ethiopia and Eritrea and - in the absence of
substantial breakthroughs - will hold true for
Liberia, the Sahara Democratic Republic, the Sudan,
Somalia (see Green 1993c), and Angola when they
enter into post catastrophe contexts. The acceptance
of rehabilitation as the centre piece of poverty
reduction and - in Mozambique - of output and
food security restoration is not yet achieved, much
less acted upon.
If this presentation looks unlike most received
wisdom and analysis (though, except perhaps in
total coverage, it is not unique) then it is worth
recalling who has forged that conventional wis-
dom and done the bulk of that analysis. Certainly
not potential programme users nor persons trying
to respond to their stated preferences and usually
not afflicted country nationals at all.'4 And then to
reflect on the Africa proverb 'Until the lions have
their historians, tales of hunting will always
glorify the hunter'.
See following page for references.
' Presentation for financial mobilisation - domestic budget or donor
- is a different issue. If a programme or part of a programme is a
priority to make rehabilitation effective, seeking funding under
that rubric is appropriate. That is - or should be - without prejudice
to implementational modalities.
14 The Centre for Refugee Studies at Oxford has repeatedly stressed
this point. See, e.g., Barbara Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid, Oxford
University Press, 1986.
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